Purpose -To report on an empirical study in psycholinguistics that revealed a difference between European and American patterns of thinking and to provide a brief history of a 30-year effort to modify the philosophy of science in order to make it more suitable as a guide to doing research in the social sciences. Design/methodology/approach -Assesses the approach of Heinz von Foerster, who used a deductive approach to science rather than an American empirical approach. Furthermore, von Foerster was willing to modify not only science but also the philosophy of science. By proposing that scientists pay attention to the observer as well as the observed, he added a dimension to the philosophy of science, which affects all disciplines. Findings -Proposes an additional dimension that might be added to the philosophy of science. Paying attention to both the observer and the receiving society suggests a communication metaphor rather than the photograph metaphor, which has prevailed in the philosophy of science. Examining the philosophical underpinnings of science rather than just testing or extending an existing theory is a type of inquiry that springs from von Foerster's enthusiasm for tackling interesting problems unimpeded by disciplinary boundaries. Originality/value -An assessment of the contribution of the multidisciplinary approach to science of von Foerster
INTRODUCTION
This paper consists of two parts. The first part is a report on an empirical study in psycholinguistics that revealed a difference between European and American patterns of thinking. The difference helps to explain the work that Heinz von Foerster did at the Biological Computer Laboratory at the University of Illinois in the 1960s and early 1970s and reveals how his approach differed from that of his American contemporaries. The difference in thinking provides evidence that different observers not only perceive differently but also seek to create science in different ways.
The second part of the paper is a brief history of a 30-year effort to modify the philosophy of science in order to make it more suitable as a guide to doing research in the social sciences. This second part is itself divided into two parts. The first part deals with the effort to develop and to win acceptance for second order cybernetics or what I have called "biological cybernetics." The second part describes what I call "social cybernetics" and distinguishes it from "biological cybernetics."
The development and promotion of both biological cybernetics and social cybernetics are described using a theory of the advancement of scientific thought. This theory combines the work of Thomas Kuhn on the history of science and the more normative work of philosophers of science such as Karl Popper and Wladislaw Krajewski. Finally, the development of both second order cybernetics and social cybernetics are shown to be related to the social context in which they were formulated.
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STYLES OF THOUGHT
In 1990 a group of Russian managers were studying at The George Washington University under a program supported by a Russian association for scientists and engineers. At the time I was interested in a particular method for doing cross-cultural research, the Associated Group Analysis (AGA) method. (Szalay, 1984) This psycholinguistic method uses word associations to reveal the meanings of words. Words can have different meanings for different groups of people. Hence, the study of language is an important tool in the study of culture. In the AGA method each subject is given a set of "stimulus words." For each stimulus word the subject writes down all the other words that come to mind. After one minute the subject goes to the next stimulus word. The words that are written down first are weighted more heavily than the words written down later. The results from a group of subjects are combined. Comparing the results from two groups, in this case Russian managers and American managers, reveals how words are associated in the minds of the subjects and hence the differences in the meanings of the stimulus words as perceived by the two groups.
Eighty-four stimulus words were given to sixteen Russian managers and twenty-four American managers. (Umpleby, 1991a) There were two interesting results from this study. First, in comparison with other AGA studies, the meanings of the stimulus words for the two groups did not overlap very much. That is, the two groups wrote down different words. Usually two groups of people use mostly the same words but the order in which the words are written down, and hence their weightings, are different. The use of different words denotes a high cultural distance between the two groups. This large cultural difference suggests that the Cold War had cultural as well as political origins.
The second result was the observation by Pavel Makeyenko that the Americans wrote down more specific words whereas the Russians wrote down more general words. For example, Figure 1 shows that American managers associated the stimulus word "bank" with "savings, loans, teller, and checks." Russian managers associated "bank" with "percentages, economy, capital, and necessity." Figure 2 indicates that American managers associated "capitalist" with "rich, money-maker, freedom and entrepreneur." Russian managers associated "capitalist" with "work, owner, USA, stock, economy, exploitation, and society." For the stimulus word "corporation" (Figure 3 ) American managers wrote down "buyer, sales, money, client and shopping." Russian managers wrote down "association, competition, firm, economics, business and society." For the stimulus phrase "labor union" (Figure 4 ) American managers wrote down " workers, wages, power, crime, collective bargaining, and strikes." The Russian managers wrote down "society, fees, passes, and whole." It seems that Americans seek meaning in specifics or applications whereas Russians seek meaning in larger categories such as society or philosophy. The difference in patterns of thought is not limited to Russians and Americans. It also seems to apply to continental Europeans vs. Britons and Americans. In the years since this study was done, I have repeatedly been reminded of this difference in the ways that Europeans and Americans establish meaning. Here are a few examples.
In 1960 Heinz von Foerster published an article on world population growth in Science magazine. (von Foerster, et al., 1960) The article claimed that, if the historical trend continued, world population would go to infinity in 2026. The article touched off a heated debate in the letters section of Science magazine, usually a very sober journal. (Umpleby, 1990b) The critics claimed that such a conclusion was clearly preposterous and unworthy of serious consideration. Heinz and his co-authors replied that in the scientific community "support of a hypothesis is gained through compatibility with experimental observation rather than by arguments about what should be the case or what should not be the case." The debate continued intermittently for two years. See Figure 5 . Originally I thought that Heinz was just very clever in his replies. Now I think that his American critics were looking for implications or applications, whereas Heinz was speaking within the context of theory and philosophy.
In the mid-1990s I visited the Institute for Systems Analysis in Moscow to meet with colleagues. When I arrived, we went out to lunch, and one of the subjects of conversation was the study I had done suggesting that Americans reason down to specific applications whereas Europeans reason up to larger, societal categories. They found the results interesting. Also over lunch my Russian colleagues asked me to take part in a discussion of the internet and its implications that was scheduled for later in the day. I agreed. The first speaker at the panel discussion gave a brief technical description of the internet. The second speaker, a Russian social scientist, drew pictures in the air with his hands as he spoke. Looking up with his hands above his head he created a matrix of society. He then sought to locate the internet within that social matrix. When I spoke, I ticked off on my fingers several areas of application -business, government, education and journalism -and indicated how the internet was being used in each category and how I thought those applications would develop. As I spoke Nikolai Lapin, the moderator of the panel discussion, began to smile. When I finished, he asked me to explain to the group what I had said over lunch about Russians reasoning up to general categories and Americans reasoning down to specifics. I did, and the people in the room also smiled. The talk given by the Russian social scientist and my talk were examples of his looking up to larger categories and my looking down to specifics as ways to establish meaning. See Figure 6 . Each semester I require the students in some of my management courses to do group projects. I tell them that this is the laboratory part of the course. Their task is to work with an organization and do a project that will improve the performance of the organization. A few years ago one student group consisted of a few American students and one student from Germany. The German student and one of the American students debated for most of the semester how to begin the project. The American said that they needed to get started, that the project would "take shape" as they worked on it. The German student insisted that a detailed plan was needed before work could begin. Apparently they argued for most of the semester about how to begin. Eventually they did complete a project. But the German student was greatly frustrated that they never had a detailed description of what they would do until they wrote the final report. I was reminded of this experience as I listened to the debate in the United Nations in 2002 between the U.S. and Britain on one side and France, Germany, and Russia on the other side about how to deal with Iraq. Certainly political considerations were paramount. But the different styles of thought in continental Europe and in the U.S. and U.K. may also have been a factor.
Lately I have become involved with a group of people working to increase discussions of human evolution or to increase participation in community planning. This group of people, who are devoted to creating "new agoras" or community discussions, includes many members of the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS). Both at a conversation in Fuschl, Austria, in April 2002 and at the ISSS conference in Crete in July 2003, it became apparent that there were two quite different views about how to proceed. (Espinosa and Umpleby, 2003) One group, consisting mostly of people from the US and the UK, tends to focus on achieving improvements in the quality of life in organizations or communities. The other group, which has been strongly influenced by Bela H. Banathy, tends to stress discussion and conceptualization rather than action. Banathy immigrated to the US from Hungary. In the flow charts from the American group the arrows showing how to proceed point down. (Umpleby, et al., 2004) In the flow chart from the Banathy group, the arrows point up. (Bausch, 2004) What are the implications of these two different ways of establishing meaning? I think there are several. First, the different patterns of thought help to explain why the professors who moved from Europe to the US during the 1930s and 1940s made such important contributions. Indeed, the idea of a research university is a German invention that was imported by the US in the 1930s. Second, many of the leaders of systems science and cybernetics in the US were immigrants from Europe. Third, the fact that these immigrants have now retired or died helps to explain the decline of systems science programs in the US. Fourth, the fact that systems science and cybernetics research in Europe seems to be increasing suggests that systems science, which involves the search for more general theories, may be more compatible with European styles of thought than with American styles of thought. By choosing to study with Heinz von Foerster at the University of Illinois, I unintentionally obtained both an American and a European education. I learned how to perceive both points of view.
CREATING MORE GENERAL THEORIES
In 1974 Heinz von Foerster introduced the term "second order cybernetics" at a conference of the American Society for Cybernetics in Philadelphia. (von Foerster, 1979 ) Also in 1974 I wrote an article on how to make a scientific revolution. (Umpleby, 1974) In 1975 I received my PhD and moved from Champaign, Illinois, to Washington, DC. In the following years Heinz and his friends and colleagues tried in a variety of ways to promote the idea of second order cybernetics, that is, to include the observer in the domain of science. We started an electronic discussion group for members of the systems science community where second order cybernetics was discussed. (Umpleby, 1979) We invited Heinz to be the leading speaker at meetings of the American Society for Cybernetics. We arranged meetings with Soviet scientists to provide an international forum for discussing epistemological issues. (Umpleby and Sadovsky, 1991b) And we worked to further develop the ideas and their implications. (Umpleby, 1992) For a European, creating more general theories is a logical and desirable thing to do. For example, Karl Popper, a leading European philosopher of science, praised "bold conjectures" on the grounds that a more general theory will be more vulnerable to falsification. (Miller, 1985) If repeated tests fail to falsify the more general theory, it is regarded as a noteworthy contribution.
Heinz never said that he sought to create more general theories, but his actions were consistent with this goal. His primary interest was in "the observer," and he knew very well that "every statement made is made by an observer." Hence, any change in thinking about "the observer" would affect all scientific fields and, indeed, everyday life as well. Heinz also introduced me to the correspondence principle -any new theory should reduce to the old theory, to which it corresponds, for those cases in which the old theory is known to hold. Krajewski (1977) emphasizes that the correspondence principle requires that a new dimension be added. See Figure 7 . The advantage of formulating the new point of view in terms of a new dimension is that nothing is lost from the old point of view. All the data that supports the old theory also supports the new theory. But additional phenomena can be explained with the added explanatory power brought by the additional dimension.
The same approach can be applied to the philosophy of science. Heinz never referred to the correspondence principle in his articles, but I think that viewing his work as adding a dimension to the philosophy of science, namely "amount of attention paid to the observer," helps to indicate the importance of his work. Kuhn (1970) suggested that scientific fields advance by moving from a period of normal science (defined as puzzle-solving) to a period of revolutionary science to a new period of normal science after the new point of view is accepted. However, Kuhn devoted most of his book to describing the change from normal science to revolutionary science by means of "incommensurable definitions." Kuhn had very little to say about how science changes from a period of revolutionary science to a new period of normal science. I believe the ideal way to make this transition is to define the old and new points of view in terms of the correspondence principle. This requires defining a dimension that is present in the new view but absent in the old view. Hence, the work of Kuhn and Popper can be combined. See Figure 8 . This process of change in science is very similar to Hegel's dialectical process -thesis (normal science), antithesis (revolutionary science), synthesis (new period of normal science).
In the discussions of second order cybernetics a key starting point was to distinguish second order cybernetics from first order cybernetics. See Figure 9 . After making the case for second order cybernetics at many conferences, I began to feel that we should change our strategy. I felt it was time to move beyond distinguishing the old and new views. I wanted to make the new point of view not a revolutionary position but rather the new normal science. This required defining a dimension that the new point of view was adding to the old view. That addition was "the amount of attention paid to the observer."
In the late 1980s other second order cyberneticians, particularly Francisco Varela, pointed out to me that my conception of second order cybernetics was not the same as theirs. Heinz had always been interested in what he called the one brain problem of human cognition and perhaps the two brain problem of communication. However, I had always been interested in social systems, what Heinz called the n-brain problem. To distinguish my concerns from the concerns of the other second order cyberneticians, I created Figure 10 in which I defined three points of view in cybernetics. (Umpleby, 1997) Engineering cybernetics was first order cybernetics. Biological cybernetics was second order cybernetics. And social cybernetics was the view I wanted to develop. After several years of promoting this third point of view, I had the impression that the distinction was being accepted. Indeed the work of Niklas Luhmann seemed to make similar points. One way of understanding the shift from biological cybernetics to social cybernetics is to see it as the next step in a movement across a philosophical matrix. See Figure 11 . (Umpleby, 1992) Figure 10 distinguished social cybernetics in the same way that Figure 7 distinguished second order cybernetics. Both figures list "incommensurable definitions." As the distinction between biological and social cybernetics came to be accepted, it seemed that creating a new period of normal science required defining a new dimension. So, in 2003 I suggested that the new view could be formulated in a manner consistent with the correspondence principle, if another new dimension were added to the philosophy of science, namely the amount of attention paid to the receiving society. (Medvedeva and Umpleby, 2003) Hence, I have described two cycles of first distinguishing a new point of view from the old view and then later defining the difference between the new view and the old view in terms of a new dimension that was not present or was neglected in the old view. I worked with Heinz von Foerster not only at the University of Illinois but also during his retirement years through the activities of the American Society for Cybernetics. His idea of second order cybernetics provided me with the opportunity to attempt to make a scientific revolution and to observe along the way how the process occurred. The process was then repeated during what Albert Mueller has called the "turn toward society." See Figure 11 .
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF SCIENTIFIC INNOVATIONS
Another way to understand the development of both second order cybernetics and social cybernetics is to view them within the societal contexts in which they were developed. I believe that second order cybernetics can be regarded as a solution to a cultural problem in central Europe, namely an absence of doubt. (Umpleby, 2002b) Indeed second order cybernetics can be regarded as a scientific proof that one can never be certain about what one knows and that other people are necessary to challenge or support conclusions based on personal experience. Heinz lived through World War II. Although he never wrote about his motives, I believe that his development of second order cybernetics was in part the result of a desire to change a set of cultural beliefs that had contributed to the wars in Europe, most recently the wars in the former Yugoslavia.
The second dimension that I suggest be added to the philosophy of science also was influenced by the social context. In the 1980s I arranged a series of meetings between American and Soviet scientists. My intent was to bring together American system scientists in order to discuss recent developments in the field, including second order cybernetics. (Umpleby, 1987) During the 1980s glasnost and perestroika occurred, and we began to discuss how social scientists could contribute to the transitions in the postcommunist countries. (Umpleby, 1991c) The economist Jeffrey Sachs, when describing his work advising countries how to make the transition to market economies, made this comment, "We put the patient on the operating table and opened its chest, but we discovered that it had a completely different anatomy." When Western economists made recommendations for how to make the transitions in the post-communist countries, they did not take into account the structure of industries, the values of the people, and the training of managers. They assumed that economic theories are universal and that they would work the same way in all countries.
As one example, Western economists thought that if manufacturing firms were privatized, a market economy would be established. However, the structure of the Soviet economy was quite different from the structure of Western economies. In the West people assume that efficiency is maximized by having profit-oriented units compete. There are anti-trust laws to be sure that monopolies do not arise and that competition is preserved. But the Soviet economy was based on the belief that efficiency is maximized by concentrating expertise in one organization. Hence, there tended to be one automobile factory, one truck factory, one tire factory, etc. When this structure was privatized, the result was privately owned monopolies, not competing firms.
As a second example, Western economists assume that owners of firms are motivated to make them profitable. They believe that turning factories over to their managers or to private owners leads to investment and modernization, so the firms can compete in the global market. Instead, many Russian managers stripped saleable assets from their firms, deposited the money in foreign banks, and left the rest to rust. It was like giving a person an automobile and then watching as he sold the engine and left the body to rust. Why did Russian managers do that? When asked, they replied that they expected the government to recognize its mistake and renationalize the firms. They felt that they had to take what they could as fast as they could. The result was that Russian industrial output declined 50%. Only in the last few years has capital flight been replaced by capital investment.
The experiences with the post-communist countries suggest that economic theories are not as universal as was believed. The structure of institutions and the beliefs and values of the people need to be carefully considered before proposing policies. No doubt some macro-economic principles are applicable to all countries. But because of different institutions and different beliefs and values, how economic principles are realized can vary widely. The process of development requires not just pro-growth macro-economic policies but also new institutions, new educational programs and time for values to adjust to a new social order.
Hence, the experiences with advising the transitions in the post-communist countries support the addition of a second dimension to the philosophy of science --the amount of attention paid to the characteristics of the society in which a theory is applied. Social science theories are created at least in part as a way of changing or influencing the evolution of social systems. Cultures and legal systems differ. So, descriptions of needed changes, even social science theories, may need to be different for different societies. When attempting to change a large, complex social system, it is necessary to have theories of how the society functions and changes at each level of the society.
A NEW METAPHOR FOR SCIENCE
Adding these two dimensions to the philosophy of science changes the metaphor underlying the philosophy of science. Most work in the philosophy of science assumes that the purpose of science is to create accurate descriptions of phenomena. This can be called the photograph metaphor of science -theories are photographs or descriptions of the way the world works. However, a communication metaphor of the philosophy of science would be consistent with adding the two dimensions: "amount of attention paid to the observer" and "amount of attention paid to the receiving society." Viewing science as a communication process is certainly not new, but adding these two dimensions to the philosophy of science brings to mind Shannon's model of communication (sender, message, receiver) . (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) A philosophy of science based on progress in the social sciences is likely to be different from a philosophy of science based on progress in the physical sciences. Examples from physics led to a photograph metaphor for the philosophy of science. Examples from the social sciences suggest a communication metaphor for the philosophy of science. In the social sciences there is a "dialogue" between ideas and society. (Umpleby, 1990a) For example, the growth of industry in England led Adam Smith to write The Wealth of Nations. This book further promoted industrialization. With industrialization came sharp differences in wealth between rich and poor, simulating Karl Marx to write Das Kapital. This book led to socialist movements. As a way of preventing the triumph of socialism during the depression of the 1930s John Maynard Keynes formulated a theory urging government intervention to stimulate the economy. Later, government programs, and their inefficiencies, led Milton Friedman and others to advocate privatization of stateowned enterprises. The social sciences are different from the physical sciences because theories of social systems, when acted upon, change the way social systems operate.
For about 30 years I was involved in a struggle to shift the philosophy of science from an "objective" to a more "subjective" perspective. That change in view is now widely accepted. Presently interest seems to be shifting from the creation of knowledge to the use of knowledge. (Gibbons, et al., 1994) That is, people are concerned not just with the creation of theoretical descriptions of how the world works but with developing methods that will help people make use of what is known. The goal of academic inquiry, at least in some fields, is becoming less the creation of theory and more the achievement of positive results in social systems. (Umpleby, 2002a) This shift of attention is consistent with the change from a photograph metaphor to a communication metaphor for the philosophy of science.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE TWO DIMENSIONS
Thomas Kuhn's conception of the evolution of science --from a period of "normal science" to a period of "revolutionary science" to another period of "normal science" --is consistent with the photograph metaphor of science. The communication metaphor of science is consistent with a "dialogue" between ideas and society where a new social situation produces a new theory of society which, when acted upon, leads to a new social situation.
If we assume that social science theories are not merely descriptions of society but also imply recommendations for action, then one way to evaluate a theory is to examine whether indeed society improves as a result of acting on the recommendations implicit in the theory. Karl Popper advocated piecemeal social engineering as preferable to utopian social engineering. Donald T. Campbell (1988) suggested that political reforms should be treated as experiments and carefully evaluated. Treating a theory as itself an experiment goes a step further and makes sense only if theories are seen as means to an end, not as ends in themselves. Popper proposed that theories are conjectures that may be refuted by experiments, rather like a drawing that proves not to be a good likeness. However, the idea that a theory might not be widely accepted, perhaps for cultural reasons, or might lead to undesirable results is more consistent with the communication metaphor.
A communication metaphor of science could lead to a broadening of the responsibilities of scientists. If the social implications of science are considered to be part of the responsibility of scientists in a particular field, then issues now dealt with in the fields of "science and society" or "science policy" could become the responsibility of specialists in the field rather than the domain of other specialists. Hence, every field would think about its social implications and this would be part of the field, not something separate from the field studied by people with a different specialization. One advantage of taking a broader view of the subject matter of each scientific discipline might be more rapid social learning and more reflection on the social implications of scientific ideas.
In terms of the treatment of objectivity, the history of science can be thought of as having passed through three stages. (Umpleby, 1975) In the first stage of "unquestioned objectivity" scientists dealt with inanimate objects, such as pendula and planets. A second stage of "constructed objectivity" arose when scientists working in the fields of biology and psychology devised experimental groups and control groups to cope with the problem of knowing subjects who might try to outwit or cooperate with the experimenter. A third stage of "contested objectivity" became necessary when critical theory pointed out the roles of scientists as social and political actors. (Mitroff and Blankenship, 1973) Whereas the first and second stages in the treatment of objectivity may be compatible with the photograph metaphor of science, the third state of contested objectivity requires the communication metaphor of science. Communication occurs both between ideas and society and among scientists and the general public.
Whereas viewing objectivity as contested is needed when dealing with social systems, it can also be helpful when dealing with either the social implications of the natural sciences or when trying to understand debates within the natural sciences. The work on group facilitation methods provides examples of how the subjectivity of many individuals can be combined in a productive manner. (Umpleby and Oyler, 2003) This dialectical approach to making contributions to science or the philosophy of science resulted from working with Heinz von Foerster. He never advocated it directly, but he either used it, by distinguishing first and second order cybernetics (incommensurable definitions), or he introduced me to it (the correspondence principle).
